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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DON FOSTER,

Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
ELMO J. STEED, an individual,
GORDON G. WHEELER, an individual,
ELMO J. STEED and GORDON G.
WHEELER dba S & W TEXACO SERVICE,
a partnership, and TEXACO, INC.,
a corporation,

No.
10685

Defendants,

TEXACO, INC., a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant, Texaco Inc. (Texaco) files this reply to
demonstrate that the undisputed facts relied upon by Respondent in his brief clearly support Texaco's position that
Steed and Wheeler, d/b/a S & W Texaco Service, are independent contractors. In addition, Texaco will show that the
cases cited in the Respondent's brief are inapplicable to the
factual situation of this case and do not support his contentions.

2

POINT I
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS RECITED
BY RESPONDENT, THE APPELLANT, TEXACO IS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Although Respondent sets for the the facts "in a light
most favorable to the trial court's judgment" (Brief, page
3), in any light the undisputed facts clearly show that Steed
and Wheeler are independent contractors in the operation
and conduct of their business the S & W Texaco Service.
Respondent's brief demonstrates that Texaco neither exercised direct nor indirect control of the day-by-day business
and operation of S & W Texaco Service. 1 Respondent's brief,
does not point out a single instance where Texaco required
Steed and Wheeler to operate S & W Texaco Service in any
particular manner. To the contrary, Respondent's factual
statement carefully uses the term "encourage" when describing the approach of Texaco's representatives to Steed
and Wheeler. Respondent further states that Texaco's employees " 'tried to sell' the operator on meeting Texaco's
standards ... " (Brief, page 7) Indeed, if Steed and Wheeler
are Texaco's agents in the operation of S & W Texaco Service, Texaco did not have to "try to sell" its standards. Instead of showing control of the business operation, Respondent's factual statement shows that Steed and Wheeler
lRespondent asserts at page 7 of his brief that "Wheeler and
Steed could not sell products purchased from others under Texaco's
trademark, nor mixed or co-mingled products [and that] the only
pumps and si~ns at. the stat~on w~re marke~ Texaco.". '.£'he~e ~nex
plained assertions might be m1sleadmg. There is no prov1s1on m. e:t~er
the lease or the agreement of sale with Wheeler (R. 51-52) proh1b1tmg
or limiting the lessee's right to sell products from other manufacturers,
refiners or third parties in any manner. In fact, the r~cord shc;>ws that
Steed and Wheeler sold products manufactured by third parties.
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are fully independent in the conduct and operation of their
partnership business.
Significantly, Respondent does not advance any facts
showing that the relationship between Texaco and Steed and
Wheeler is not controlled by the lease and agreement of sale.
It is undisputed that the entire relationship between Texaco
and Steed and Wheeler at the time of the accident was governed by a lease and agreement of sale with Wheeler dated
May 28, 1962 and June, 1, 1962, respectively. (R.51-52) 2
Under the lease, Texaco leased the premises "together
with buildings, improvements, fixtures, equipment and
facilities owned or leased by lessor" for a definite term at a
stipulated rental. The agreement of sale merely provides the
maximum amount of products Texaco is required to deliver
in a year, the points of delivery, applicable discounts and
the terms of payment. Neither the lease nor the agreement
of sale specify the method, manner or details of the operation and the management of the leased premises. Under both
contracts, the lessee has the exclusive responsibility for operation and management. The contracts do not contain any
provision setting the resale prices of the products purchased
by the lessee, nor do they specify an amount of product
which must be sold. Title to all products sold and purchased
under the sales agreement passes directly to the purchaser
and the sales agreement does not contain any limitation on
the resale terms. Neither contract requires any particular
hours of operation of the leased premises and the contracts
2Respondent concedes "All documents evidencing the rel:;-tions~ip
of the parties were prepared by Texaco on standard forms. (Brief,
p. 14) [Emphasis added]
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do not prohibit the sale of products manufactured or distributed by other suppliers. They contain no provisions for
the inspection of the business records of the lessee, nor is
there any requirement that the lessee devote his full time to
the operation of the station and accept no outside work. In
addition, there is no requirement that the lessee wear any
particular uniform and the lessee is not required to make
reports of any nature concerning his business activities.
On their face, these instruments establish a landlordtenant relationship. There are no other agreements or understandings, expressed or implied, between the parties.
There is no evidence that these contracts as written do not
establish the relationship of the parties or that the parties
abandoned the contracts and Texaco took control of the
station.
Wheeler has possession and control of the leased premises only under the May 28th lease. Significantly, the
partnership operated the leased premises independently and
have not only sold products manufactured by others, but
have also conducted substantial other business activities on
the premises without interference in any manner from
Texaco.
In the operation and management of the leased service
station, Wheeler purchased gasoline and other products
from Texaco on a cash basis and is responsible for the storage and taxes on the products purchased. The partnership
bears all of the operating costs of the business, including
taxes, franchise and license fees, heat, light, telephone and
water. Steed and Wheeler are free to sell their products for
cash or credit at their own discretion and they are free to
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set their own terms, including the extension of credit to
customers of their choice. They retain all the profits and
bear all of the risk of loss in their business.
Of course, there is no presumption of agency. After the
extensive depositions in this case, Respondent has not shown
that the relationship between Texaco and Steed and Wheeler
is other than landlord-tenant. It is well settled that a landlord is not an insurer against the negligence of his tenant
and that tenancy alone does not render the landlord liable
for the tortious acts of his tenant. Tryba v. Petcoff, 10 Wis.
2d 308, 103 N.W.2d 14 (1960); Sherman v. Texas Co., 340
Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 916 (1960); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d
815 (Okla. 1963); Brittain v. Atlantic Refining Co., 126
N.J.L. 528, 19 A.2d 793 (1941); Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140
Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943); Texas Co. v. Grant, 143
Tex. 145, 182 S.W.2d 996 (1944) ; Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co.,
227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939). Hence, Texaco is not
liable for the torts of its lessee.
Essentially, Respondent contends that a fact question
arises because ( 1) Texaco's lease required Wheeler to keep the
leased premises "in a clean, safe and healthful condition" and
Texaco inspected the premises; (2) a large Texaco sign was
displayed on the premises; (3) Texaco made certain repairs
to the leased premises; and ( 4) Texaco could summarily
terminate Wheeler. Additionally, Respondent contends that
"Texaco encouraged the operator to identify with its product" and received marketing assistance. (Brief, page 14) 3
BRespondent also points out that there were no articles <?f partn~r
ship between Steed and Wheeler and 3:ls<? ~hat they had !ailed to file
a statement of doing business under a flctit10us name. (B_rief, page 14)
If these facts have significance, they show that Texaco_ did n<?t concern
itself with the operation and conduct of the partnership busmss.
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(1)

An obligation to maintain the premises does not create
an agency

Certainly, a lessor can require the lessee to maintain the
leased premises in a specified condition without making the
lessee his agent. Such a standard lease provision is prudent
to protect the lessor's interest in the leased promises. Moreover, Texaco's periodic inspections and suggestions on
cleanliness are consistent with Wheeler's obligations under
the lease. As held in Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C. 422,
2 S.E.2d 26 (1939), Texaco is within its right as a landlord
in making these inspections and giving suggestions.

(2)

A sign advertising Texaco's brand products does not
establish that Texaco runs the station

Although S & W Texaco Service exhibited signs and
insignia bearing the Texaco registered trademarks and
trade names, such displays do not alter the landlord-tenant
relationship. It is well known that such signs and insignia
are displayed throughout the country by independent dealers
who sell Texaco branded products. Similarly, signs and insignia are also displayed by independent dealers selling
petroleum products of other marketers. It is clear that these
signs and emblems merely provide notice to the motoring
public that a particular brand of petroleum products is
available for sale at the service station. Reynolds v. Skelly
Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939); Coe v.
Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Sherman v. Texas Co.,
340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 916 (1960).

7
As held by the court in the Sherman case (165 N.E.2d,
p.917):
"There was testimony that the defendant has a
distinguishing color and sign scheme for gasoline stations either owned or operated so that identification on
all such stations is standard. This station had a 'characteristic * * * banjo pole' displaying a round disc with
the standard Texaco identification, 'a red star with
green and the letters "Texaco." ' The gasoline pumps
were of a standard type and color scheme, which is
used for both owned and leased stations. The station
had the name Texaco on its signs and the characteristic
colors, white with green trim, on the building. On stations 'operated solely by * * * [the defendant]' there is
a sign over the door in six inch block letters reading
'The Texas Company.' There was no such sign over the
door of this station or elsewhere on the premises. The
lease of a fully equipped station, including three pumJ)6
and a 'banjo pole and sign,' corroborated the inference
from the open display of Texaco identification that this
display was with the defendant's approval and pursuant
to its design.
"We rule that the representation of the signs was
confined to the statement that Texaco gasoline was sold
at the station. We agree with the statement in Reynolds
v. Skelly Oil Co., 277 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827,
that it 'is a matter of common knowledge that these
trademark signs are displayed * * * by independent
dealers' [Citation omitted]"
( 3)

Minor repairs by Texaco to the premises are consistent with its interest as a landlord

Of course, a landlord is authorized to make minor repairs to the premises with the consent of the tenant. Again,
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by making such repairs, the landlord merely protects his
interest in the leasehold.
(4)

Texaco cannot summarily terminate its lessee under
the May 28 lease

Respondent's assertion that Texaco can summarily
terminate Wheeler is contrary to the May 28 lease. Under
the lease, the service station was leased for a one-year
period and the rights and obligations of the lessor and
lessee are defined. Either party can terminate the lease "at
the end of the first year or subsequent year on ten (10)
days' prior written notice." The lease also provides that the
lessor can terminate the lease if the lessee breaches its
covenants or upon certain specified conditions. Such a
termination clause is a standard provision in leases and is
designed to protect the landlord's interest in the property.
Certainly, Texaco cannot summarily terminate Wheeler
under this provision, as Respondent asserts.
POINT II
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT
DO NOT SUPPORT HIS POSITION
The first case cited by the Respondent, Gonzales v. Derrington, 10 Cal.Rpts. 700 (1961), was reversed on appeal by
the Supreme Court of California, 363 P.2d 1, 14 Cal.Rpts. 1
(1961). In this case three drunks who had been thrown out
of a cafe secured 4112 gallons of gas in an open bucket from
a Union Oil station. They took the gas and threw it onto the
floor of the cafe and ignited it. Three persons were burned
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to death and one other was seriously injured. The Court of
Appeals in the case cited by the Respondent held that the
service station attendant, by delivering gasoline in an open
container in violation of a state statute, was negligent and
that his negligence was a proximate cause of the deaths and
injury. Union Oil was held responsible on the narrow ground
that since it had retained title to gasoline it had retained
control of the method of delivery. The Supreme Court of
California reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the
deaths and injury were the result of an independent intervening cause and that defendant Union Oil Company's
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
Two of the cases cited by the Respondent in his brief
involve injuries which were sustained as the result of certain defects in premises owned by the defendant oil company. Accordingly, an action against the defendant oil company as owner of the premises was allowed.
The first case in this category is Boronskis v. The Texas
Company, 183 N.E.2d 127 (Mass., 1962), in which the
plaintiff's property was damaged as a result of a leaking
gasoline storage tank. The storage tank was a permanent
fixture and part of the premises owned by the defendant oil
company. The defendant oil company had always authorized
inspection of the storage tanks and had paid for all repairs
to the storage tanks. The second case is Edwards v. Gulf Oil
Co., 69 Ga.App. 140, 24 S.E.2d 843 (1943), which involved
the death of a child caused by a large depression in the sidewalk adjacent to the service station which had been filled
with hot oil or tar.
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In the cases of Ryan v. Standard Oil Co., 144 S.W.2d
170, (Mo. App., 1940), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hooper, 164 .2d 743 (CA 5th, 1947), also cited by the Respondent,
the issue of whether or not the oil company controlled the
operation of the dealer was not even discussed. In the Ryan
case, the defendant in its answer had admitted that it controlled the operation of the dealer. The court on page 174
stated:
"The corporate defendant in its answer aff irmatively alleged that it solely and exclusively owned and
operated, maintained and controlled the filling station,
and that the same was not in any manner owned, operated or maintained or controlled by defendant Basye."
In the Phillips case, although the court found that there
was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of
the defendant's control and ownership of the station, there
was absolutely no discussion in the opinion as to what the
facts were on which the relationship between the oil company and dealer was based.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 42, 1 So.2d 29,
(1941), the court, in holding the defendant oil company
liable to the plaintiff, based its decision on the theory of
estoppel. The defendant, Standard Oil Company, for a long
time prior to the accident had operated the service station.
During this time the plaintiff had been a regular customer
of the station. Six weeks prior to the accident Standard Oil
leased the station to a lessee. The evidence indicated that
there was no difference in the method or manner of operation of the service station after the station was leased in
comparison to its prior operation. The court held that
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plaintiff had a right to rely upon the fact that the apparent
operation of the service station was still by the defendant
oil company.
The remaining two cases which the Respondent cites in
support of his position are clearly distinguishable upon their
facts. In Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo.App.
524, 158 S.W.2d 171 (1942), the facts clearly indicated that
the defendant oil company, through its agent, had given
orders and instructions concerning the detail of the day to
day operations of the station. Also, the dealer regularly reported to the defendant concerning lubrication and washing
income, the sale of tires, tubes and specialty items.
In Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex.
175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949), the dealer Snyder was required
to make reports to the Humble Oil Company and to "perform other duties in connection with the operation of the
station that might be required of him from time to time by
the company." Furthermore, the defendant, Humble Oil
Company, paid 75 percent of the utility bill, which was one
of the most important operating expenses of the dealer. The
Supereme Court of Texas clearly distinguishes the facts in
the Humble Oil case from the prior case of The Texas Company v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943). In The
Texas Company case the Supreme Court of Texas held that
the dealer was not the employee or agent of the defendant
oil company. The Texas Company case on its facts is very
similar to the present case. The dealer paid cash for the
merchandise purchased from the oil company, bore all of
the expenses of operating the station, employed and controlled the employees, and stood the losses and appropriated
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the profits from the operation of the station. The oil company, as a condition precedent to the leasing of the station,
had the right to maintain certain standards of cleanliness in
operating the station and held certain schools for the dealers
with respect to the operation of the service station. Instructions were also given from time to time by company
representatives on how to service cars. The Supreme Court
of Texas sustained a directed verdict in favor of the def endant, The Texas Company.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Texaco, Inc., submits that
the undisputed facts compel entry of summary judgment in
its favor. The undisputed facts conclusively show that
Texaco did not control or direct the operation of S & W
Texaco Service. Consequently, Texaco is not liable for any
alleged negligence of its lessee or its employees.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant, Texaco, Inc.

